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Subject code: Natural Resource Economics (14)INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the problem of how to optimally structure economic incentives for
landowners to enhance bio-diversity protection on private lands and to cooperate with Endangered
Species legislation. It is motivated by two observations relating to regulation under asymmetric
information. Firstly, even if landowners are compensated for regulatory losses to reduce perverse
incentives for species conservation, any compensation scheme that may be adopted must anticipate
possible strategic behavior on part of the landowners. Secondly, compensation payments on the basis of
the opportunity cost of the land do not guarantee the protection of the most valuable habitats, when the
owners have private information on the habitat value of their lands. The problem of optimally structured
incentive schemes and the existing knowledge on regulation under asymmetric information has not yet
been formally explored in the ESA literature. The paper applies a standard principal-agent framework to
design a compensatory contract scheme, which induces landowners to reveal privately held information
on conservation value of their land and to self-select a contract according to their underlying marginal
conservation costs.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of the United States continues to generate controversy in the
literature. It has received considerable criticism as a regulatory instrument for species conservation, since
its success in terms of species recovery and de-listing is judged to be only moderate (Brown and Shogren,
1998; Polasky et al, 1997; Segerson, 1997; Fox and Adamowicz, 1997). Economists criticize the ESA for
its missing economic rationale for species prioritization in the light of constrained public budgets and the
perverse incentives for private landowners
1 (Brown and Shogren, 1998; Segerson, 1997; Merrifield,
1996). The current design of the ESA lacks almost completely the theoretical underpinnings that might
reasonably guide policy (Metrick and Weitzman, 1998).  Moreover, "Shoot, shovel and shut-up" is
documented as one of landowners' strategies to avoid costly regulation. This is interpreted as a response
to uncompensated land use restrictions in favor of habitat conservation under the current legislation.
                                                  
1 Landowners play a vital role in endangered species conservation, since more than 50% of the listed endangered
species are found on private lands (Defenders of Wildlife, 1994)2
Some authors have argued that the Endangered Species Act itself has become a significant threat to
endangered species protection.
The discouraging conservation success of the ESA, and the ‘fairness debate’ lead by property
rights advocates, have motivated the 'compensation' discussion. Compensating landowners for regulatory
losses incurred under the ESA legislation, it is argued, will reduce polarization and increase acceptance of
conservation programs, as some experimental evidence on wolf protection in the Northern Rocky
Mountains shows (Defenders of Wildlife, 1994). Linking public benefits form habitat protection to
private economic decision-making, will presumably correct the skewed incentives and increase the
landowners' needed cooperation for species conservation.
Ultimately, the question of whether to compensate or not has to be resolved in a democratic
process.  Settling this question, however, does not exhaust the larger debate of how to optimally structure
any compensation scheme that may be adopted to ensure the desired regulatory results. The purpose of
this paper is to investigate the conditions and the specific design requirements if compensation is granted
to private landowners. Landowners can be expected to hold superior information not only on their
compliance with the existing regulations, but also on species and habitat value of their property. This
information is needed by the regulator to achieve an efficient regulatory outcome. However, the ESA
literature lacks formal attempts to investigate optimally structured incentives for landowners to reveal this
privately held information. This information, once revealed by the landowners, can potentially be used to
reduce the social costs of endangered species conservation.
COMPENSATION AND INFORMATION
Economic theory suggests conditions of uncertainty and informational asymmetries between
economic parties require incentive compatible compensatory schemes to reduce inefficient resource
allocations (Lewis, 1996; Wu and Babcock. 1996; Sappington, 1991; Spulber, 1988; Stiglitz, 1987;
Shavel, 1987; Holmstroem, 1979; Mirrlees, 1976). Originally researched in the context of private making3
decision delegation, the basic results of this literature equally apply to a regulatory context, when
conservation tasks are delegated to private individuals or groups thereof.
The endangered species literature recognizes asymmetric information between the regulator and
the private landowners. The argument is used for favoring as well as for rejecting compensation of private
landowners for land use restrictions under the ESA. As the discussion in the literature shows, privately
held information by the landowners has implications for both, the effectiveness of conservation and
regulatory efficiency. Consequently, compensation payments per se cannot entirely solve regulatory
problems of the endangered species legislation.
Some authors argue in favor of landowner compensation to increase the effectiveness of
conservation regulation because full monitoring of landowners' compliance with ESA stipulations is
prohibitively costly, and even impossible ( Innes, Polasky and Tschirhart, 1998; Stroup, 1997) They
conclude that failure to compensate for costly regulation defeats the purpose of the legislation as it creates
the perverse incentive for landowners to deliberately modify habitat or even extinguish species on their
land to avoid costly regulation.  Polasky and Doremus (1998) analyze the relationship between
compensations and the burden to proof violations of endangered species legislation. Unsurprisingly, they
find that if the regulator has to proof harm before imposing costly regulation, landowners are unlikely to
cooperate in information collection neither on the exiting species nor on possible harms that an intended
land use might impose. They suggest compensatory measures under certain conditions to increase
landowners' cooperation.
On efficiency grounds, however, full compensation for regulatory losses must be rejected,
because of the underlying informational asymmetries and the associated moral hazard problem (Cohen
and Radnaff, 1998; Miceli and Segerson, 1996; Blume et al. 1984).
2 In the prospect of being fully
                                                  
2 Moral hazard arises when individual economic actors engage in risk sharing under conditions in which privately
taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome (Holmstrom, 1979).  The classical example of
moral hazard originates in the insurance literature and describes ...”the tendency of insurance protection to alter
an individual’s motivation to prevent loss” (Shavell, 1979, p. 541).4
compensated for regulation, investors have a reduced incentive to avoid irreversible investment decisions
(Miceli and Segerson, 1996). Inefficient over-investment in potentially regulated (and, therefore, risky)
lands is the anticipated result of such regulation. Instead of receiving a compensation from the regulator,
some argue, the risk of incurring a regulatory taking can potentially be mitigated through risk sharing via
private insurance markets (Cohen et al., 1998).
Innes et al. (1998) addresses the problem of landowner compensation and asymmetric
information when landowners hold private information regarding their personal valuation for conserving
their property. They argue, that landowners value endangered species conservation and are potentially
willing to accept a compensation payment lower than the opportunity cost of the land. Their individual
conservation valuation, however, differs and realizing the political unpopularity and the associated
deadweight losses of raising public funds, the regulator would like to separate the landowners according
to their willingness to accept lower payments. In contrast, the landowners have an incentive to conceal
this information to extract a surplus when being compensated.
IMPLICATIONS OF HIDDEN HABITAT CHARACTERISTICS FOR REGULATORY EFFICIENCY
Habitat conservation implies a partial or full surrender of alternative land uses, such as
agriculture, forestry, mining and real estate development. Net social economic benefits over both
alternatives are maximized when attaining a socially optimal level of habitat conservation for endangered
species at minimum forgone benefits from alternative land uses. This is particularly relevant when sites
are heterogeneous in habitat qualities.
Suppose it is possible to prioritize endangered species in terms of their social value
3 and to
translate conservation value into a point scheme of potential habitat value per hectare. The potential
habitat value per ha is expressed as a quality index, which consists of long-term habitat value indicators,
such as the physical, biological and other environmental site characteristics for certain species targeted.5
Moreover, it is used to specify the conservation actions that must occur to assure the persistence of those
species
4. Individual sites are likely to differ in their ecological features and, thus, their habitat qualities
and their suitability for endangered species.  The point system allows a ranking of land parcels according
to their conservation value. Each site can be assigned a potential amount of individual conservation units
(θ m). The socially optimal level of total conservation units, Θ *, is achieved where social marginal
conservation costs and benefits are equal, C’(Θ *), are equal to social marginal benefits, B’(Θ *).
In the economic analysis, differences in the sites' index values per ha translate into differences in
individual marginal conservation costs, mc
i(θ ), for a given amount of conservation units. Regulatory
efficiency requires equal marginal costs across sites, mc
i(θ ) = mc
j(θ ), implying higher levels of
conservation units per ha the lower the marginal conservation cost, given a constant price per unit θ .
While subsidy payments potentially achieve efficiency, they do so only if the regulator has
perfect and certain knowledge on social marginal habitat conservation costs, C’(Θ ), and benefits, B’(Θ ).
This raises the question on optimal subsidy rates and their structure, if habitat quality and the
corresponding marginal conservation costs differ across sites, the regulator is not able to perfectly
distinguish amongst them, and cannot derive the social marginal costs of habitat provision.
Public agencies have only restricted access to private land, making owners likely to be
quantitatively and qualitatively better informed about the conservation value of their properties (Polasky
et al., 1997). They are better able to observe the ecological features of their parcels, the quantities and
qualities of endangered species the property hosts, their feeding, mating, and breeding habits, their
locations etc. Consequently, landowners are privately informed on individual marginal conservation costs,
mc
i(θ ). This information is needed by the regulator not only to establish a socially optimal subsidy rate
                                                                                                                                                                   
3 For a further discussion on the issue of prioritizing endangered species see Metrick and Weitzman 1996 and
1998.
4 For a detailed description of the biological considerations on determining the conservation value in terms of
conservation units see Olson et al. (1994)6
per ha of retired land (s*), but also to obtain a more complete picture on the habitat potential in the
economy.
A complication is added, if neighboring plots mutually influence their habitat values. For
example, conservation effort by one owner can increase not only the attractiveness of his own property
for endangered species, but also the attractiveness of neighboring plots. Vice versa, if one property owner
decides not to exert conservation efforts, her neighbor’s attempts to conserve may be fruitless. It is likely
that the regulator is not able to fully observe these interactions.
The theoretical literature on asymmetric information suggests that private marginal cost
information leads to strategic behavior on part of the landowners in pursuit of information rents.
Landowners with low marginal conservation cost can increase their net benefits by pretending to be 'high
cost' habitat providers. As a result, they provide less conservation units, θ , per ha than socially efficient
and receive lower total subsidy payments, but still pocket a surplus as the subsidy per conservation unit
exceeds their individual marginal cost. Consequently, total habitat conservation, Θ , is non-optimally low,
while landowners extract information rents and additional benefits from non-optimally high 'productive'
land uses.  Paying compensation based on market opportunity costs of the land does not quite capture this
point. It does not necessarily induce private landowners to reveal additional habitat quality information
and it does not guarantee habitat conservation differentiated according to the conservation value.
Essentially, compensation must be paid on the basis of the conservation performance of the landowner
and the problem of hidden ‘type’ information can be mitigated.
OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGN FOR SPECIES CONSERVATION
As suggested in the mechanism design literature (Kreps, 1990; Tirole, 1997, D'Asperemont,
1999), the regulator can mediate the informational efficiency problems by a clever design of a menu of
contracts from which landowners self select according to their individual marginal conservation costs. To
avoid strategic behavior of the low cost agents, the contracts must be specified in terms, which are
attractive solely for the cost type targeted. The role of incentives, therefore, is not only to compensate the7
landowners for private losses, but also to extract and use this privately held information to improve the
regulatory efficiency.
Basic assumptions of an optimal incentive model
Assume an agricultural setting in which land can be dedicated to both, agricultural production and
habitat conservation. Landowners, who participate in a land retirement program commit to well-defined
land use restrictions on or complete surrender of their plots
5. Accordingly, they provide habitat
conservation units at a technically determined ratio. They forgo (net present) benefits from alternative
land use, which captures the cost (marginal trade-off) of alternative land uses and habitat conservation
6.
In return, landowners receive a compensation payment as well as the benefits from the (reduced)
alternative land uses
7.
Plots are assumed to be homogeneous in their non-conservation use value
8. They differ, however,
in marginal conservation cost functions, according to their habitats values/c characteristics. For
simplicity, assume two plot types (T
i) only with 'high' and ‘low’ marginal conservation costs, mc
h(θ ) and
mc
l(θ ). The regulator knows the types of marginal conservation cost functions and can assign a
probability distribution, p
i, for each type. Therefore, she is able to derive marginal social costs of habitat
conservation; furthermore, we assume the regulator to perfectly know social marginal conservation
benefits. However, she is not able to perfectly distinguish between them and, neither, to perfectly observe
the underlying conservation action, ak (with k = l, h, of each participating owner). Conservation outcome,
θ m, with m = l, h, or an exact index thereof, however, is assumed to be perfectly observable and a perfect
signal of the underlying conservation action
9.
                                                  
5 The model follows the idea of habitat conservation plans (HCP) as suggested by the collection of articles by
Defenders of Wildlife (1994)
6 For example, the conservation value per ha agricultural or forested land differs, depending on site management
intensity.
7 Subsidy payments and returns from alternative land uses are assumed to be certain.
8 I.e. if no habitat is conserved profits per ha are equal across sites.




The regulator's objective is to maximize social welfare from habitat conservation and alternative
land use. The objective function is written as max{H} W ≡  B(Θ ) - C(Θ ), where B(Θ ) denote social benefits
and C(Θ ) the forgone benefits from alternative land uses. At the optimum, B'(Θ *) = C'(Θ *), yielding the
marginal social value, s*, per conservation unit, θ .
To minimize social costs while achieving Θ *, the regulator wishes to separate the plots according
to their marginal conservation costs, such that high cost types provide low levels of conservation units, θ l,
per ha, choosing al accordingly, and vice versa. Maximum social welfare is attained when high cost plots
provide low levels of habitat units and low costs plots provide high levels of habitat units:
Max W ≡  T
h*(θ l) + T
l*(θ h).
Notice, that the trade-off between agriculture and conservation is captured in the marginal cost
curves of providing habitat. Therefore, the optimal levels of habitat implicitly capture the optimal levels
of agricultural production.
The landowners' objective
Landowners maximize net benefits from compensation payments for participating in the land
retirement program, S(θ m), and the costs of the program in terms of the forgone benefits from agricultural
production, C
 i (θ m), i.e.
π
i = S(θ m) – C
i(θ m), with C




where type i = l implies k, m = h, and type i = h implies k, m = l. Participation in the program must yield
at least positive profits: π
i = S(θ m) – C(θ m) ≥  0, or, alternatively π
i  = S(θ m) + π





indicates the reservation profit, i.e. not participating in the land retirement program.9
Contract Specification under Symmetric Information
Firstly, consider the case when the regulator can perfectly distinguish between types and thus,
knows individual marginal conservation cost functions. She knows which type of conservation outcome is
required for each type to achieve a socially optimal conservation level. The solution is to establish a
target-outcome of conservation units for each agent that meets their reservation constraints. The regulator
offers each type a specific contract, consisting of compensation payment and an according level of habitat
protection, [S
h,θ l] and [S
l,θ h], for the high cost and low cost agent, respectively. She maximizes net






h[θ l - S
h(θ l)] + p
l[θ h - S
l(θ h)]
(2) s.t. S
h(θ l) – C
h(θ l) ≥   0 for high cost plot types
(3) S
l(θ h) – C
h(θ h)≥   0 for low cost plot types
The cost minimizing solution is to set S
h (θ l) = C
h(θ l) = π
h
0 - π
h(θ l) and    S
l(θ h) = C




landowner will produce the targeted amount of conservation.
Optimal Compensation Payments under Asymmetric Information
10
Under asymmetric information, the regulator does not know the group identity of any individual
landowner. As she is assumed to know social marginal costs and benefits of habitat conservation, she
establishes a socially optimal level of habitat conservation, Θ *, and a social price per habitat conservation
unit, s*, which we normalize to 1. She offers a menu of contracts, [S
i, θ
i], that induces self-selection and
self-identification of the landowners the desired conservation outcome on each plot.  What are the exact
terms of such contracts?
                                                  
10 The model follows largely Varian (1992) on hidden information, in which the regulator assumes the role of the
‘monopolistic’ principal and the land owners the role of the agents.10
In addition to the constraint that each agent receives her reservation profit per hectare, self-
selection constraints need to be imposed on the problem to induce each owner to commit to the 'correct'
level of habitat provision and to self-select the corresponding contract:
(4) S(θ l) – C
h(θ l) ≥  S(θ h) – C
h(θ h) for high cost plot types
(5) S(θ h) – C
l(θ h) ≥  S(θ l) – C
l(θ l) for low cost plot types,
Assuming that the landowner with higher total conservation costs also has higher marginal costs
for every unit of habitat provided
11, the self-selection constraints induce high cost land owners to prefer
low conservation outcomes and low cost owners the prefer high conservation outcomes, and to receive the
corresponding compensation payments.
The regulator’s objective is to maximize net social benefits from habitat conservation, i.e. total
social costs minus total benefits. However, as individual cost functions are not a priori observable, the
compensation payments offered to each agent differ from the actual habitat conservation costs incurred by
each agent.





(θ h), θ l, θ h} p
h[θ l - S
h(θ l)] + p




(2) S(θ l) – C
h(θ l) ≥   0 PC for high cost plot types
(3) S(θ h) – C
h(θ h)≥   0 PC for low cost plot types
incentive compatibility
constraints
(4) S(θ l) – C
h(θ l) ≥  S(θ h) – C
h(θ h) for high cost plot types
(5) S(θ h) – C
l(θ h) ≥  S(θ l) – C
l(θ l) for low cost plot types,
The solution to this maximization problem is treated by Varian (1992). The optimal payments are
derived by solving the binding constraints (2) and (5) for S(θ m):
                                                  
11 It follows from the assumed single crossing property for the landowners’ utility function u
i (s
i, c
i) = s(θ m)-c
i(θ m).11
S*(θ l) = C
h(θ l)a n d
S*(θ h) =  S(θ l) + C
l(θ h) – C
l(θ l),
which implies S*(θ h) > C
l(θ h) and S*(θ h) > S(θ l).
For high cost plots, the compensation payments are equal to the private costs (= social costs) of
habitat provision. The payments to the low cost type, however exceed private costs of habitat provision,
increasing social costs of habitat provision beyond private costs
The optimal levels of habitat conservation of each agent are given by
C’
l (θ h) = 1 = s* for the low cost landowner
and
C’
h (θ l) = 1+p
l/p
h[C’
l (θ l) - C’
h (θ l)]  <  1 = s* for the high cost landowner.
This implies that low cost types provide the socially optimal levels, whereas high cost plots provide less
habitat than socially optimal.
The solution to this problem separates the different types according to their marginal costs. It
shows, however, that the structured incentives do not fully accommodate the inefficient outcomes
resulting from asymmetric information. Some inefficiency remains in that total habitat conservation, Θ , is
less than optimal and the low cost types extract information rents, i.e. the compensation payments exceed
the private costs of providing high levels of habitat. Given the informational constraints the solution
describes the second-best provision of habitat.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER EXTENSIONS
The suggest approach for optimally structuring compensation payments in the context of
endangered species protection is a first formalized step towards addressing the implications of
informational asymmetries between the regulator and the landowners regarding the habitat value. The
standard result is derived that the compensation incentives for the low cost landowners need to exceed
their conservation costs in order to avoid inefficient levels of habitat provision.12
Several points deserve discussion and need to be extended for further development of the
approach. Firstly, the standard model assumes that habitat values between landowners are completely
independent of each other. This implies that contracts can be formulated on a one to one basis between
the regulator and the landowner. More realistically, however, habitat values of individual plots within a
defined area are mutually dependent on conservation levels on surrounding sites. This implies that the
level of habitat provided by other landowners enters the habitat production function of all individuals who
consider participating in the program. The conservation externalities between different landowners must
be explicitly accommodated by the incentive scheme to avoid free riding of the landowners on each
others'  conservation contributions or a complete disinterest of the landowners in the program.
Secondly, it is prohibitively costly to fully monitor each individual conservation outcome and
conservation outcome is likely to be randomly disturbed by nature beyond the landowners' control. As the
landowners' individual conservation decisions affect the probability distribution of the conservation
outcome, a potential moral hazard problem arises when conservation outcome is not a perfect signal of
the underlying conservation effort (and the opportunity cost ) by the owner.
Both aspects raise the question on how the conservation performance should be evaluated and its
implications for the incentive schemes. Conservation performance should be based on objectively
measurable indicators, which establish a relationship between (a) (imperfectly) monitored habitat value
and the actual habitat value; (b) the monitored total habitat value and the individual conservation
contributions on each plot; (c) the individual conservation outcome and the actual incurred cost of
conservation.  For example, a multi tier compensation scheme could be designed that consists of a flat
rate for participation and variable premiums according to the individual and group conservation
successes.13
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